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ATTORNEY CONDUCT - A DEFENSE ATTORNEY WHO FOL-
LOWS ABA STANDARDS WHEN HIS CLIENT MANIFESTS AN 
INTENT TO COMMIT PERJURY IS NOT JEOPARDIZING THE 
CLIENT'S RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986). 
A defense attorney represented a man charged with first degree 
murder.' Shortly before trial, the defendant informed his attorney that 
he intended to commit petjury.2 The attorney attempted to dissuade the 
defendant from testifying falsely. 3 The attorney advised the defendant 
that, as an officer of the court, he could not suborn petjury and would 
inform the court of the petjury, seek to withdraw from the case, and 
testify as a rebuttal witness against the defendant. 4 During trial, the de-
fendant testified truthfully and was convicted of second degree murder. 5 
On appeal, the defendant claimed that his attorney denied him effec-
tive assistance of counsel by dissuading him from testifying as he pro-
posed. 6 The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the judgment because the 
attorney had good cause to believe the defendant's proposed testimony 
would be petjurious. 7 Subsequently, the defendant petitioned for a writ 
of habeas corpus.8 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
1. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 160-61 (1986). 
2. /d. While the attorney prepared for trial, the defendant maintained that, although 
he had not actually seen a gun, he thought his victim had a gun. One week before 
trial, however, the defendant stated that he had seen something "metallic" in his 
victim's hand. He also remarked, "If I don't say I saw a gun, I'm dead." /d. 
3. /d. at 161. The attorney explained that a claim of self-defense would not require 
that a gun actually exist, only that the defendant reasonably believed that he was in 
danger. /d. At trial, the attorney presented evidence to show that the victim had 
been observed with guns on other occasions, that the police failed to thoroughly 
search the victim's apartment, and that the victim's family had taken all his belong-
ings prior to the police search. /d. at 162. 
4. /d. at 161. 
5. /d. at 161-62. The defendant testified that he knew his victim had a gun, and that 
he acted sw.iftly in self-defense when the victim reached for the gun. On cross exam-
ination, however, the defendant admitted that he never actually saw a gun. /d. 
Upon his conviction by a jury, the defendant was sentenced to prison for forty years. 
See State v. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d 468, 470 (Iowa 1978). 
6. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d at 470. 
7. /d. at 471. The Supreme Court oflowa commended both the attorney and his asso-
ciate for their ethical conduct and noted that their actions comported with the appli-
cable provisions of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers. See 
id. (citing IowA CODE ANN.§ 610 App. Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility 
for Lawyers (1973) DR 4-101(C)(3) ("A lawyer may reveal ... [t]he intention of his 
client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime.") and 
Canon 7 ("A lawyer should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the 
law.")). Iowa adopted the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility on Oct. 
4, 1971. See also infra note 69. 
8. See Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, 1326 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'd sub. nom., Nix v. 
Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986). The district court denied the defendant's petition 
and held that, because the defendant had no right to testify falsely, the attorney's 
conduct did not deny the defendant due process or effective assistance of counsel. 
/d. (citing Whiteside v. Scurr, No. Civil81-246-C, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Iowa Dec. 7, 
1982)). The court adopted the state court's finding that the defendant's proposed 
testimony would have been peijurious. /d. Consequently, Whiteside does not in-
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Circuit held that the defendant had been denied a fair trial9 and effective 
assistance of counsel because the attorney's conduct compromised his 
duties of zealous advocacy, loyalty, and confidentiality to the defend-
ant. 10 The United States Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit and 
held that, because the attorney's conduct was a reasonable professional 
response under the circumstances, the defendant was not denied the ef-
fective assistance of counsel. 11 
Under the fifth 12 and sixth13 amendments of the United States Con-
stitution, the federal government must provide individuals with the fun-
damental right to a fair trial. 14 Under the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment, 15 state governments also must provide individu-
als with this right. In McMann v. Richardson 16 the Supreme Court ex-
panded this right to include the "effective assistance of counsel." 17 
Although the Court equated effective assistance of counsel with compe-
volve an attorney who lacks good cause to believe his client intends to commit per-
jury. But cf United States ex rei. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3rd Cir. 
1977) (the attorney lacked a firm factual basis for his belief that the defendant would 
testify falsely); Butler v. United States, 414 A.2d 844, 850 (D.C. 1980) ("[T)he rec-
ord does not support an inference that defense counsel knew his client was going to 
commit perjury."). 
9. Whiteside, 744 F.2d at 1326. The court indicated that the defendant's claims ·that 
he had been denied due process, the right to present his defense, and effective assist-
ance of counsel are different legal arguments for one ground of relief - that his 
attorney denied him the right to a fair trial. Id. 
10. /d. at 1330. The Eighth Circuit applied the two prong test established in Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) for effective assistance of counsel. Under this 
test, the court considers both the attorney's conduct and whether that conduct 
prejudiced the outcome of the case. See infra notes 36-50 and accompanying text. 
The court concluded that the attorney had threatened his client, thereby undermin-
ing the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel. The court also consid-
ered that the attorney's threat to testify against his client created a conflict of 
interest between his duty of loyalty to the defendant and his concern for the code of 
professional ethics. A conflict of interest under Strickland creates a presumption of 
prejudice. /d. at 1328-31. 
11. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986). The Court voted unanimously to reverse the 
Eighth Circuit, but the Court was sharply divided (5-4) on its rationale. Although 
both opinions applied Strickland, the majority (White, Powell, Rehnquist, 
O'Connor, and Burger) concentrated on the attorney's conduct in light of prevailing 
professional norms. ld. at 159-76. The concurring opinion (Blackmun, Brennan, 
Marshall, and Stevens) focused exclusively on the prejudice element of Strickland 
because they considered this case an improper forum for discussing professional 
ethics. ld. at 177-91. 
12. The fifth amendment states, "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. Amendment V. 
13. The sixth amendment states, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to ... a public trial, by an impartial jury ... and to have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. Amendment VI. 
14. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984). 
15. The fourteenth amendment states, "No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, ... nor ... 
deprive any person ... due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. Amendment XIV. 
16. 397 u.s. 759 (1970). 
17. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (dicta). 
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tent assistance of counsel, 18 it provided no additional guidelines. 19 With-
out adequate guidelines, courts have established their own standards for 
measuring the effective assistance of counsel.2° Nonetheless, the right to 
effective assistance of counsel provides an additional legal basis for chal-
lenging the fairness of a trial by appeal or collateral attack.21 
Before and after McMann, defense attorneys have been faced with a 
dilemma when they learn that their client intends to commit perjury.22 
On the one hand, an attorney has a duty to provide zealous advocacy and 
confidentiality for his client. On the other hand, an attorney has a duty 
18. /d. at 771. 
19. See Maryland v. Marzullo, 435 U.S. lOll, 1011 (1978) (White, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari) ("the Federal Courts of Appeals are in disarray" concerning a 
standard of ineffective assistance of counsel). 
20. /d. at 1011-12. A host of standards evolved as lower courts considered ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims. A number of courts considered whether counsel's con-
duct made a farce, sham, or mockery of the trial. See United States v. Campbell, 616 
F.2d 1151, 1152 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1121 (1st 
Cir. 1978). Others considered whether the defendant's trial was prejudiced. See 
Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1331 (9th Cir. 1978) (en bane). Courts faced 
with ineffective assistance claims by defendants who intended to commit peijury at 
trial also applied a variety of standards. See Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727,732 
(9th Cir. 1978) (concurring opinion); Rickenbacher v. Warden, 550 F.2d 62, 65 (2d 
Cir. 1976); United States v. DeCoster, 159 U.S. App. D.C. 326, 331,487 F.2d 1197, 
1202 (4th Cir. 1973); State v. Jones, 110 Ariz. 546, 550, 521 P.2d 978, 980, cert. 
denied, 419 U.S. 1004 (1974). Some courts considered whether the attorney's con-
duct was reasonable. See Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429, 435 (D.C. 
1976); People v. Dudley, 46 Ill. 2d 305, 308, 263 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1970); State v. Fos-
night, 235 Kan. 52, 59, 679 P.2d 174, 180 (1984); State v. Robinson, 290 N.C. 56, 
66, 224 S.E.2d 174, 179 (1976); People v. Lowery, 52 Ill. App. 3d 44, 48, 366 
N.E.2d 155, 158 (1977). 
For a thorough analysis of the various standards federal and state courts devel-
oped for ineffective assistance of counsel claims in general, see Casenote, Constitu-
tional Law - Sixth Amendment Guarantees Assistance of Counsel That Is 
Reasonably Effective and Does Not Prejudice the Fairness of the Proceedings, 14 U. 
BALT. L. REV. 335, 337-44 (1985). 
21. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may challenge counsel's conduct regard-
ing a wide range of matters. See Martin v. Rose, 744 F.2d 1245, 1249 (6th Cir. 
1984) (trial strategy); Davis v. Wainwright, 547 F.2d 261, 264 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(speedy trial); United States v. Rodriguez, 498 F.2d 302, 310 (5th Cir. 1974) (use of 
entrapment defense); United States v. Katz, 425 F.2d 928, 931 (2d Cir. 1970) (coun-
sel fell asleep at trial). See also, Modem Status of Rule as to Test in Federal Court 
of Effective Representation by Counsel, 26 A.L.R. Fed. 218 (1976). Notwithstand-
ing the broad application of ineffective assistance claims, this casenote focuses par-
ticularly upon ineffective assistance claims that consider the conduct of an attorney 
who has been placed in a dilemma when he learns that his client intends to commit 
peijury. 
22. See United States ex rei. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115 (3rd Cir. 1977); McKis-
sick v. United States, 379 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1967); Newcomb v. State, 651 P.2d 
1176 (Alaska 1982); State v. Perkins, 141 Ariz. 278, 686 P.2d 1248 (1984); People v. 
Blye, 233 Cal. App. 2d 143,43 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1965); State v. Henderson, 205 Kan. 
231, 468 P.2d 136 (1970); People v. Collier, lOS Mich. App. 46, 306 N.W.2d 387 
(1981); People v. Salquerro, 433 N.Y.S.2d 711, 107 Misc. 2d 155 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1980);In re Palmer, 296 N.C. 638, 252 S.E.2d 784 (1979); State v. Trapp, 52 Ohio 
App. 2d 189, 368 N.E.2d 1278 (1977); Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 447 A.2d 305 (Pa. 
1982). 
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to assist the court in its search for truth.23 If an attorney discloses to the 
court his client's intention to commit perjury, he may have breached his 
duty to provide confidentiality to his client.24 Notwithstanding, if the 
attorney does not disclose his client's intention to commit perjury, he 
may have breached his duty to assist the court in its search for the 
truth. 25 Once an attorney learns that the defendant intends to commit 
perjury, he knows that his actions will be subject to scrutiny.26 This oc-
curs when the defendant claims, either on appeal or in collateral proceed-
ings, that his attorney's conduct deprived him of his right to a fair trial, 
due process, or effective assistance of counsel.27 
The American Bar Association Standards Relating to the Adminis-
tration of Criminal Justice (ABA Defense Function Standard) define eth-
ical standards for criminal trial attorneys faced with a defendant who 
intends to commit perjury.28 Upon learning that the defendant intends 
23. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986). See also Burger, Standards of Conduct 
for Prosecution and Defense Personnel: A Judge's Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 11 
(1966); Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The 
Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966); Noonan, The Purposes of 
Advocacy and Limits of Confidentiality, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1485 (1966); Erickson, 
The Perjurious Defendant: A Proposed Solution to the Defense Lawyer's Conflicting 
Ethical Obligations to the Court and to His Client, 59 DEN. L. J. 75 (1981); Brazil, 
Unanticipated Client Perjury and the Col/isison of Rules of Ethics, Evidence and 
Constitutional Law, 44 Mo. L. REv. 601 (1979); Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 809 (1977); Callan & David, Professional Responsibility and the Duty 
of Confidentiality: Disclosure of Client Misconduct in an Adversary System, 29 
RUTGERS L. REV. 32 (1976). 
24. See Freedman, supra note 23, at 1477; see also New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 
458-60 (1979) (A criminal defendant's testimony cannot be impeached at trial with 
testimony given before a grand jury under a grant of immunity.); Gerders v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 80, 89-91 (1976) (the trial court erred by forbidding the defendant 
to consult with his defense counsel during an overnight recess, even though it rec-
ognized that the truth seeking process might suffer). 
25. See Burger, supra note 23, at 12. See also In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945) 
("[a]ll perjured relevant testimony is at war with justice"); Clark v. United States, 
289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) ("There is a privilege protecting communications between 
attorney and client. The privilege takes flight if the relation is abused."). 
26. See supra note 22. 
27. See supra note 9. Convicted defendants challenging an attorney's conduct in these 
situations claim they have been denied any number of constitutional rights. See, 
e.g., United States ex rei. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 117 (3d Cir. 1977) (right 
to testify); Newcomb v. State, 651 P.2d 1176, 1181 (Alaska App. 1982) (abuse of 
discretion); People v. Blye, 233 Cal. App. 2d 143, 147,43 Cal. Rptr. 231,236 (1965) 
(right to testify); People v. Collier, 105 Mich. App. 46, 54, 306 N.W.2d 387, 391 
(1981) (fair trial); State v. Trapp, 52 Ohio App. 2d 189, 195, 368 N.E.2d 1278, 1281 
(1977) (assistance of counsel). Because the attorney's conduct in this dilemma 
evokes a variety of constitutional challenges, the effect of Nix v. Whiteside is not 
limited to ineffective assistance of counsel claims, but ought to be considered when-
ever the dilemma arises, no matter what specific challenge is made. 
28. Section 4-7.7 of the Standards states: 
"Testimony by the defendant. 
(a) If the defendant has admitted to defense counsel facts which es-
tablish guilt and counsel's independent investigation established that the 
admissions are true but the defendant insists on the right to trial, counsel 
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to commit perjury, the attorney should move to withdraw from the 
case. 29 If the court denies the motion, the attorney should allow the de-
fendant to testify in narrative form. 30 If an attorney's conduct complies 
with these guidelines, the majority of courts will reject the defendant's 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.31 
Nevertheless, defendants claim that this behavior by their attorney 
deprives them of effective assistance of counsel.32 First, an attorney's 
attempt to withdraw evinces a desire to disassociate himself from the 
defendant. 33 Second, the narrative form of the defendant's testimony 
must strongly discourage the defendant against taking the witness stand to 
testify perjuriously. 
(b) If, in advance of trial, the defendant insists that he or she will 
take the stand to testify perjuriously, the lawyer may withdraw from the 
case, if that is feasible, seeking leave of the court if necessary, but the court 
should not be advised of the lawyer's reason for seeking to do so. 
(c) If withdrawal from the case is not feasible or is not permitted by 
the court, or if the situation arises immediately preceding trial or during 
the trial and the defendant insists upon testifying perjuriously in his or her 
own behalf, it is unprofessional conduct for the lawyer to lend aid to the 
perjury or use the perjured testimony. Before the defendant takes the stand 
in these circumstances, the lawyer should make a record of the fact that 
the defendant is taking the stand against the advice of counsel in some 
appropriate manner without revealing the fact to the court. The lawyer 
may identify the witness as the defendant and may ask appropriate ques-
tions of the defendant when it is believed that the defendant's answers will 
not be perjurious. As to matters for which it is believed the defendant will 
offer perjurious testimony, the lawyer should seek to avoid direct examina-
tion of the defendant in the conventional manner; instead, the lawyer 
should ask the defendant if he or she wishes to make any additional state-
ment concerning the case to the trier or triers of the facts. A lawyer may 
not later argue the defendant's known false version of facts to the jury as 
worthy of belief, and may not recite or rely upon the false testimony in his 
or her closing argument. 
See American Bar Association Standards Relating to the Administration of Crimi-
nal Justice: The Defense Function (2d ed. 1980). In Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 
570 (1961), the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a Georgia law which denied a 
defendant the assistance of counsel while the defendant made his unsworn statement 
to the Court. Id. at 572, 580. Arguably, because the narrative approach set out by 
the ABA Defense Function Standard also deprives the defendant assistance by his 
attorney, it may fall under the prohibition set forth in Ferguson. The ABA Defense 
Function Standard is but one set of guidelines for practicing attorneys. See infra 
note 69. 
29. See Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429, 432 (D.C. 1976); State v. Fosnight, 
235 Kan. 52, 59, 679 P.2d 174, 177 (1904); State v. Robinson, 290 N.C. 56, 58, 224 
S.E.2d 174, 175 (1976). 
30. See United States v. Campbell, 616 F.2d 1151, 1152 (9th Cir. 1980); Thornton, 357 
A.2d at 433; People v. Lowery, 52 Ill. App. 3d 44, 45-46, 366 N.E.2d 155, 156 
(1977); Fosnight, 235 Kan. at 59, 679 P.2d at 177. 
31. See Campbell, 616 F.2d 1151; Thornton, 357 A.2d 429; Lowery, 52 Ill. App. 3d 44, 
366 N.E.2d 155; Fosnight, 235 Kan. 52, 679 P.2d 174; Robinson, 290 N.C. 56, 224 
S.E.2d 174. But cf Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978). 
32. See supra note 31. 
33. Cardwell, 575 F.2d at 732 (concurring opinion); Thornton, 357 A.2d at 437; Robin-
son, 290 N.C. at 66-67, 224 S.E.2d at 180. 
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alerts jury susptcton regarding the defendant's credibility.34 Notwith-
standing these assertions, most courts hold that conduct in compliance 
with the ABA Defense Function Standard is sufficient proof that the de-
fendant was provided with effective assistance of counsel. 35 
The Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington 36 established a 
standard for determining ineffective assistance of counsel. In Strickland, 
the defendant claimed that his attorney's failure to request a psychiatric 
examination or find character witnesses during his capital sentencing 
hearing denied him effective assistance of counsel. 37 According to the 
Court, the benchmark for judging a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel is "whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper func-
tioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as 
having produced a just result."38 To reach this determination, the Court 
developed a conjunctive two-prong test requiring that the defendant 
show that the attorney's performance was deficient and that this defi-
ciency prejudiced his defense.39 Unless the defendant meets both re-
quirements, his claim fails. 40 
The first prong - counsel's performance - is measured by an ob-
jective standard of reasonableness.41 Although reasonableness is consid-
ered in light of prevailing professional norms, norms such as those 
34. Thornton, 357 A.2d at 437; Lowery, 52 Ill. App. 3d at 46, 366 N.E.2d at 157. Cf 
Robinson, 290 N.C. at 67, 224 S.E.2d at 180 (the narrative testimony in this case 
was that of a witness). 
35. Campbell, 616 F.2d at 1152 (counsel made an effort to comply with the ABA De-
fense Function Standard); Thornton, 357 A.2d at 437-38 ("The ethical strictures 
under which an attorney acts forbid him to tender evidence or make statements 
which he knows to be false as a matter of fact."); Lowery, 52 Ill. App. 3d at 47, 366 
N.E.2d at 157-58 ("We fail to understand how the actions of an attorney which 
closely parallels the recommendations of the American Bar Association Standards 
for the Administration of Criminal Justice, can establish incompetence sufficient to 
constitute a denial of defendant's right to effective representation."); Fosnight, 235 
Kan. at 57, 679 P.2d at 179 (citing State v. Henderson, 205 Kan. 231,468 P.2d 136 
(1970)) ("The high ethical standards demanded of counsel in no way mollify the 
fair, full and loyal representation to which an accused is entitled ... [c]ounsel, of 
course, must protect the interests of his client and defend with all his skill and 
energy, but he must do so in an ethical manner."); Robinson, 290 N.C. at 66, 224 
S.E.2d at 179-80 (counsel action in notifying the court that the defendant intends to 
commit perjury was commendable). But see Cardwell, 575 F.2d at 730; Butler v. 
United States, 414 A.2d 844, 852 (D.C. 1980) (when counsel follows professional 
norms and informs the court of his ethical dilemma, he prevents the judge as 
factfinder from objectively deciding the merits of the case and thereby denies the 
defendant his right to a fair trial). 
36. 466 u.s. 668 (1984). 
37. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,675 (1984). There was no indication of any 
mental illness. /d. at 676. By acting as he did, the attorney was able to prevent the 
prosecution from presenting damaging evidence of the defendant's background. /d. 
at 673. The defendant already had pleaded guilty to three murders. /d. at 672. 
38. /d. at 686. The basic purpose of the right is to ensure the defendant a fair trial. /d. 
at 684-85. 
39. /d. at 687. 
40. /d. 
41. /d. at 687-88. 
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reflected in ABA standards are only guidelines.42 An attorney's conduct 
is evaluated not with hindsight, but from the perspective of an attorney 
who is faced with the dilemma in light of surrounding circumstances.43 
Because evaluating an attorney's conduct is inherently difficult, the de-
fendant must bear the burden of proving that the attorney's conduct was 
unreasonable under the circumstances. 44 
The second prong - prejudice to the outcome - requires that the 
defendant prove that there exists a reasonable probability, but for the 
attorney's conduct, that the result of the trial would have been differ-
ent.45 A possibility that the attorney's conduct could have affected the 
outcome of the trial is insufficient. The attorney's conduct must actually 
have undermined the defendant's status once the trial has ended.46 A 
limited presumption of prejudice will lie if the defendant proves that the 
attorney had a conflict of interest while representing him.47 
If the defendant fails to satisfy either prong, the court need not ad-
dress the other.48 It is more difficult for the defendant to satisfy the sec-
ond prong - prejudice to the outcome, than the first prong - counsel's 
performance.49 Therefore, to avoid grading an attorney's performance, 
courts should initially focus upon the prejudice prong to determine 
whether the defendant was denied his right to effective assistance of 
counsel. 5° 
Although all federal courts51 have recognized, and many state 
courts 52 have adopted the Strickland two prong test, its application dif-
42. !d. at 688. 
43. !d. at 689. 
44. !d. 
45. !d. at 694. 
46. !d. at 693. 
47. !d. at 692. As explanation of this limited presumption of prejudice provision, the 
Court cited Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980). !d. The conflict of interest in 
Cuyler arose when the attorney represented multiple parties in a murder case. See 
Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 345. The Strickland Court also cited Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure 44(c) Goint representation) as explanation of the Strickland presumption 
provision. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. 
48. !d. at 697. 
49. !d. 
50. !d. 
51. See Morrison v. Kimmelman, 752 F.2d 918, 922 (3d Cir. 1985); Imge v. Procunier, 
758 F.2d 1010 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Vincent, 758 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 
1985); Perron v. Perrin, 742 F.2d 669 (1st Cir. 1984); Mitchell v. Scully, 746 F.2d 
951 (2d Cir. 1984); Knighton v. Maggio, 740 F.2d 1344 (5th Cir. 1984); Rogers v. 
Israel, 746 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1984); Kellog v. Scurr, 741 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 
1984); McGee v. Crist, 739 F.2d 505 (lOth Cir. 1984); Songer v. Wainwright, 733 
F.2d 788 (11th Cir. 1984). See generally Special Project, Fifteenth Annual Review 
of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals 1984-
1985 Trial, 74 GEO. L.J. 751, 756-65 (1986). 
52. See Baldwin v. State, 456 So. 2d 129 (Ala. 1984); State v. Salazar, 146 Ariz. 540, 707 
P.2d 944 (1985); Curry v. United States, 498 A.2d 534 (D.C. App. 1985); Quince v. 
State, 477 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 1985); Brogdon v. State, 255 Ga. 64, 335 S.E.2d 383 
(1985); People v. Butler, 137 Ill. App. 3d 704, 484 N.E.2d 921 (1985); Coffv. State, 
483 N.E.2d 39 (Ind. 1985); Harris v. State, 303 Md. 685, 496 A.2d 1074 (1985); 
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fers from court to court. 53 Despite the nonuniform application of the 
test, the Court has yet to clarify the generalized standards set out in 
Strickland. 54 In Hill v. Lockhart, 55 however, the Court merely extended 
the application of Strickland to include a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel during plea bargaining. 56 
Three ·courts have applied the Strickland standard in cases where a 
defendant intended to commit perjury. 57 In United States v. Curtis, 58 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the at-
torney's refusal to allow the defendant to take the stand did not consti-
tute ineffective assistance of counsel because the defendant, who had no 
right to testify falsely, was not prejudiced.59 Conversely, in State v. 
Lee,60 the Supreme Court of Arizona held that an attorney's failure to 
follow ethical guidelines when he permitted two witnesses to perjure 
themselves resulted in a denial of the defendant's right to effective assist-
ance of counsel.61 In Whiteside v. Scurr,62 however, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the attorney's attempts 
Carter v. State, 698 S.W.2d 589 (Mo. App. 1985); State v. Davidson, Ti N.C. App. 
540, 335 S.E.2d 518 (1985). 
53. See Burger v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 930, 940 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (considers first 
prong only); McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 900 (11th Cir. 1985) (considers 
second prong only); Tsirizotakis v. Lefevre, 736 F.2d 57, 62-65 (2d Cir.) (considers 
both prongs), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 869 (1984); Knighton v. Maggio, 740 F.2d 1344, 
1350 (5th Cir. 1984) (considers first prong only); Rogers v. Israel, 746 F.2d 1288, 
1292 n.3 (7th Cir. 1984) (considers both prongs); see also State v. Salazar, 146 Ariz. 
540, 542, 707 P.2d 944, 945 (1985) ("In deciding an ineffective assistance claim the 
court need not approach the inquiry in specific order or address both prongs of the 
inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing in one."); Curry v. United 
States, 498 A.2d 534, 540 (D.C. App. 1985) (considers both prongs); Brogdon v. 
State, 255 Ga. 64, 67, 335 S.E.2d 383, 386 (1985) (considers both prongs); State v. 
Carter, 698 S.W.2d 589, 590 (Mo. App. 1985) (considers both prongs); State v. Da-
vidson, 77 N.C. App. 540, 544, 335 S.E.2d 518, 520 (1985) (considers both prongs). 
54. See Waye v. Morris, 469 U.S. 908, 909 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also 
Alvord v. Wainwright, 469 U.S. 956, 959-60 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting the 
importance of ABA ethical standards as guides in determining the reasonableness of 
counsel's assistance). 
55. 475 u.s. 52 (1985). 
56. See Hill v. Lockhart, 475 U.S. 52, 57-60 (1985). 
57. See United States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070 (7th Cir. 1984); Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 
F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1984); State v. Lee, 142 Ariz. 210, 689 P.2d 153 (1984). 
58. 742 F.2d 1070. 
59. /d. at 1075. The attorney knew the defendant would perjure himself if allowed to 
testify. In accord with DR 7-102(a)(4), the attorriey refused to permit his client to 
take the stand. /d. 
60. 142 Ariz. 210, 689 P.2d 153. 
61. /d. at 216, 689 P.2d at 159. The attorney's conduct fell below the minimal stan-
dards acceptable. /d. Although Maryland has yet to consider an attorney's conduct 
when faced with a client intending perjury, it has dealt with the issue of an attor-
ney's conduct regarding a perjury alibi witness. See State v. Lloyd, 48 Md. App. 
535, 541, 429 A.2d 244, 247-48 (1981) (an attorney's failure to call an alibi witness 
did not render his assistance ineffective where the defendant admitted to his attor-
ney that he committed the crime). See also Cornell v. State of Maryland, 396 F. 
Supp. 1092, 1096-1104 (D. Md. 1975) (an attorney's failure to call an alibi witnesses 
and to offer evidence tending to prove the defendant's innocence did not render the 
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to dissuade his client from testifying falsely rendered his assistance inef-
fective because his conduct prejudiced the trial outcome for his client63 
and was unreasonable. 64 
In Nix v. Whiteside, 65 the Supreme Court relied upon the first prong 
of the Strickland test to determine whether the attorney's conduct pro-
tected his client's right to effective assistance of counsel. 66 The Court 
recognized the attorney's ethical duty to advance his client's interests 
zealously.67 The Court limited that duty, however, to lawful conduct 
compatible with the search for truth. 68 
The Court supported its position with a century of the legal profes-
sion's canons and codes of ethics, all of which temper an attorney's ad-
vocacy for his client with his duty to comply with professional norms of 
attorney's assistance ineffective where the defendant admitted to his attorney that he 
committed the crime). 
62. 744 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1984). 
63. Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, 1328 (8th Cir. 1984). The attorney threatened to 
testify against the defendant if he persued his planned perjury. The attorney's ac-
tions deprived the defendant of due process. /d. "Surely a lawyer who actually 
testified against his own client could not be said to be rendering effective assistance. 
The same is true, we think, of a lawyer who threatens to testify against his own 
client." /d. at 1331. 
64. /d. at 1331. "[C]ounsel went so far in his ... commendable zeal to avoid deceiving 
the court that he became an adversary to his own client." /d. at 1331. 
65. 475 U.S. 157 (1986) (The court received this case in the form of a writ of habeas 
corpus.) The issue in Nix is "whether the Sixth Amendment right of a criminal 
defendant to [effective] assistance of counsel is violated when an attorney refuses to 
cooperate with the defendant in presenting perjured testimony at his trial." /d. at 
159. 
66. /d. at 166-71. The Court recognized that two codes of ethics exist: (1) the Model 
Code of Professional Responsibility adopted by the ABA in 1969 and subsequently 
adopted by nearly every state (with modifications), and (2) the more recent Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted by the ABA in 1983. At the time Nix was 
decided, thirteen states had adopted the Model Rules: Arizona, Arkansas, Dela-
ware, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North 
Carolina, and Washington. /d. at 167 n.4. Since the Court's decision, Maryland 
adopted the Model Rules, effective January 1, 1987. 13 Md. Reg. 1-52 (1986). As a 
backdrop to its analysis, the Court made it clear that the defendant did not have a 
right to testify falsely. Nix, 415 U.S. at 173 (citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 
(1971)). There appears to be debate within the Court whether the right to testify is 
constitutionally guaranteed. Nix, 475 U.S. at 164 & 168 n.5. For a historical out-
line of the development of a criminal defendant's right to testify, see Ferguson v. 
Georgia 365 U.S. 570 (1961). 
67. See Nix, 415 U.S. at 166. See also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITY Canon 7; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3; Freedman, 
supra note 23. 
68. See Nix, 415 U.S. at 168. The Court concluded: 
[T]he legal profession has accepted that an attorney's ethical duty to 
advance the interest of his client is limited by an equally solemn duty to 
comply with the law and standards of professional conduct; it specifically 
insures that the client may not use false evidence. 
Chief Judge Burger has advocated that an attorney's obligation to the court's 
•·lsearch for truth" is dominant over his obligation to his client, particularly when 
the client is intending perjury. See Burger, supra note 23. 
602 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 16 
conduct. 69 Citing the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the Court 
opined that an attorney's first duty is to attempt to dissuade his client 
from committing perjury.70 If unsuccessful, the attorney should advise 
the trial judge of the defendant's attempt to commit perjury and with-
draw from the case.71 The Court concluded that, if an attorney's con-
duct falls within the codes of professional norms, there can be no 
deprivation of effective assistance of counsel under the sixth 
69. Nix, 475 U.S. at 166-67 ("nor should any lawyer render any service or advice in-
volving disloyalty to the law .... He must ... observe and advise his client to 
observe the statute of law") (quoting the first Canons of Professional Ethics Canon 
32 (1908)); see also Canons of Professional Ethics Canon 37 (1982) ("The an-
nounced intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the confi-
dences which [the attorney] is bound to respect."). See MODEL CODE OF 
PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY 
DR 7-102 Representing a Client Within the Bounds of the Law. 
A. In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: 
• • • 
(4) Knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence. 
• • • 
(7) Counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyerknows to be 
illegal or fraudulent. 
• • • 
B. A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that: 
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a 
fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his cli-
ent to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do 
so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal, 
except when the information is protected as a privileged 
communication. 
See also ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
Rule 3.3 (1983) Candor toward the Tribunal 
a. A lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal; 
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is neces-
sary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client; 
• • • 
(4) Offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has 
offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer 
shall take reasonable remedial measures. 
b. The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of the 
proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of infor-
mation otherwise protected by Rule 1.6. (client confidentiality) 
(added) 
c. A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably be-
lieves is false. 
• • • 
See also Model Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3 comment (1983). 
70. See Nix, 475 U.S. at 169. The Court viewed Nix as a case in which the attorney 
successfully dissuaded his client from committing perjury. /d. at 172. See also 
Model Rules, rule 3.3, supra note 69; Wolfram, supra note 23, at 846. 
71. See Nix, 475 U.S. at 169-70. Both the Model Rules and the Rules of Professional 
Conduct sanction disclosure of the perjury and withdrawal from the case. See 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.3(a)(4) & Comment (1983); Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct DR 2-110(B)(2), (C)(1)(C), (2), DR 7-102(A)(4) & 
(7) (1980). 
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amendment. n 
Critical of the majority opinion, the four-judge concurrence did not 
examine the attorney's conduct.73 Instead, the concurrence relied upon 
the second prong of the Strickland two prong test and held that the de-
fendant failed to show any cognizable prejudice. 74 The concurrence rea-
soned that the defendant's claim relied upon the belief that, if he had 
been allowed to testify falsely, he would have been acquitted.75 The con-
currence, however, concluded that withholding false testimony could not 
detract from the reliability of a trial because a defendant's right to testify 
does not extend to perjured testimony.76 Thus, the defendant was at-
tempting to claim a right the law did not recognize.77 Consequently, the 
defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel because he suf-
fered no prejudice. 78 
Nix expands the Strickland test for effective assistance of counsel in 
three ways. First, the divergent approaches used by the majority and con-
currence implicitly suggest that trial courts may choose which prong of 
the Strickland test to apply. The concurrence pointed out that under 
Strickland, claims should be disposed of on grounds of insufficient preju-
dice whenever possible.79 The majority, however, focused primarily 
upon whether the attorney's conduct was reasonable. 8° Following the 
majority's interpretation, courts can examine more readily the conduct of 
an attorney in specific circumstances, rather than limiting their decision 
to whether the defendant suffered prejudice. These decisions should pro-
vide more guidance to practitioners and trial courts in their efforts to 
ensure a fair trial for defendants. Thus, the majority's analysis provides 
72. See Nix, 475 U.S. at 175. Although the Court speaks in terms of codes of ethics, the 
majority appears most persuaded by the more recent Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct. /d. at 170 n.6. The concurring opinion claims that the majority opinion 
effectively constitutionalizes the code of ethics regarding this matter and that each 
situation requires specific actions which cannot be generalized in any code of con-
duct. /d. at 177 (Brennan concurring). Nevertheless, the majority states that it is 
not constitutionalizing any code of ethics. Furthermore, conduct that is acceptable 
under the sixth amendment is broader than the requirements of ethical standards. 
Thus, a breach of an ethical standard is not necessarily a denial of effective assist-
ance of counsel. /d. at 165. 
73. See Nix, 475 U.S. at 177. The concurring Justices did not believe a federal habeas 
corpus case was the proper forum in which to resolve the attorney dilemma of effec-
tive assistance of a client intending perjury. /d. at 177-78. In this regard, the con-
currence was in agreement with the Eighth Circuit's approach in Whiteside v. Scurr, 
744 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1984). 
74. /d. at 186-87. The concurrence suggests that under Strickland, the second prong-
prejudice- should be considered first. /d. at 184. 
75. /d. at 186. 
76. /d. at 185-86. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). 
77. Nix, 475 U.S. at 186. 
78. /d. at 186-87. Because the prejudice was not proved, the concurrence found no 
reason to consider the attorney's conduct. /d. at 188. See supra note 44-49 and 
accompanying text. 
79. Nix, 475 U.S. at 184. 
80. /d. at 165-75. 
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greater guidance for determining the proper conduct for an attorney who 
is found with a difficult ethical dilemma. 81 
Second, the majority's strong reliance upon the professional codes of 
ethics suggests that such codes may be the sole basis for rejecting an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 82 The Strickland Court character-
ized the professional codes of ethics as "only guides" in determining 
what is reasonable attorney conduct. 83 Nevertheless, the majority rested 
its opinion upon the canons of ethics and current rules of professional 
conduct. 84 Specifically, the Court concluded that, if an attorney has not 
breached a recognized professional duty, there can be no deprivation of 
the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel. 85 Using this rea-
soning, the Court avoids the anomoly that an attorney could conceivably 
render ethical assistance of counsel, but not effective assistance of coun-
sel. 86 Consequently, professional codes of ethics provide more than a 
mere relevant factor in determining reasonable conduct: they provide 
the determining factor for evaluating the merits of an ineffective assist-
ance of counsel claim. 87 
Third, the concurring opinion's application of the prejudice prong 
expands the Strickland test by requiring proof that a right be violated. 88 
The concurrence suggested that a defendant is not prejudiced unless he 
can prove that he was deprived of a right. Under Strickland, the preju-
dice prong was satisfied if the outcome of the trial would have been dif-
ferent but for the attorney's conduct. 89 The concurring opinion, 
however, reasoned that, because the defendant had no right to testify 
falsely, his inability to do so could not have prejudiced his case.90 Under 
this reasoning, a defendant intending perjury could never show prejudice. 
Also, proof that the attorney acted unreasonably by preventing the de-
fendant from testifying falsely would have been irrelevant because the 
81. Compare Nix, 475 U.S. at 169-70 (an attorney may attempt to dissuade his client 
from testifying falsely, inform the court of the perjury, withdraw from the case; but 
an attorney may not passively tolerate any act of perjury) with Nix, 475 U.S. at 177 
(Blackmun, J., concurring) ("How an attorney ought to act when faced with a client 
who intends to commit perjury at trial" ought not be considered in a federal habeas 
corpus case). The Court was in complete agreement regarding what constitutes a 
conflict of interest under Strickland. The Court determined that a claim by a crimi-
nal defendant intending to commit perjury that a conflict of interest exists between 
his attorney's duty to his client and to the court is not the kind of conflict of interest 
envisioned by Strickland. Nix, 475 U.S. at 175-76, 187-88. See supra note 47 and 
accompanying text. 
82. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text. 
83. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
84. See Nix, 475 U.S. at 165-70. 
85. /d. at 175. 
86. Contra Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1984). 
87. See Nix, 475 U.S. at 175. An attorney who acts in accord with the ethical guidelines 
of the ABA will provide his client with effective assistance of counsel. 
88. See /d. at 186. 
89. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 674. 
90. See Nix, 475 U.S. at 186-87. 
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defendant could not prove this conduct prejudiced the outcome of the 
trial.91 Implicitly, the concurrence effectuates a per se rule that no preju-
dice is suffered when a defendant claims he was unable to testify falsely. 
Nix is the first case in which the Supreme Court considered the di-
lemma an attorney faces when his client intends to commit perjury. The 
Court joins the majority of jurisdictions that reject challenges to an attor-
ney's conduct92 and puts to rest the argument made by a minority of 
courts that an attorney's duty to his client supersedes his duty to the 
court.93 
Nevertheless, several uncertainties remain regarding the procedure 
an attorney may follow when a client announces his intention to commit 
perjury. Although the Court embraced most of the ABA guidelines, the 
Court rejected the ABA Defense Function Standard that provides for 
narrative testimony when the defendant's testimony is false. 94 In this 
regard, the Court has favored the Model Rules that prohibit attorneys 
from passively tolerating false testimony.95 The Court concluded that 
most courts rejected this standard,96 but apparently overlooked a number 
of courts that embraced the ABA Defense Function Standard when 
faced with facts similar to those in Nix. 97 According to the Court's rea-
soning, an attorney who follows the ABA Defense Function Standard is 
suborning perjury.98 Consequently, Nix will discourage attorneys from 
permitting their clients to narrate testimony they know may be 
untruthful. 
Nix also fails to address whether an attorney's conduct should de-
pend upon whether the case is before a jury or judge.99 Some courts 
distinguish between jury and non-jury cases. They contend that, once a 
judge in a non-jury trial is informed of an intended perjury, he no longer 
possesses the objectivity necessary to decide the case on the merits. 100 
Notwithstanding, the Court did not consider what effect informing the 
judge would have had because the defendant was tried by a jury and the 
attorney successfully dissuaded him from testifying falsely. Conse-
quently, this aspect of the client perjury dilemma remains unresolved. 
91. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (if defendant fails to meet either prong, his claim is 
lost). 
92. See, e.g., McKissick v. United States, 379 F.2d 754, 761 (5th Cir. 1967) (if defen-
dant informs his attorney he has committed perjury, counsel must inform the court 
or else be subject to disciplinary action); State v. Henderson, 205 Kan. 231, 236, 468 
P.2d 136, 140-41 (1970) (counsel's professional duty requires him to be honest with 
the court; confidentiality owed to his client does not extend to committing perjury). 
93. See Freedman, supra note 23, at 1477. 
94. See Nix, 475 U.S. at 170 n.6. 
95. /d. at 170-71. 
96. /d. at 170 n.6. 
97. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text. 
98. Nix, 475 U.S. at 169. 
99. See Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 730 (9th Cir. 1978); Butler v. United States, 
414 A.2d 844, 852 (D.C. 1980). 
100. See Lowery, 515 F.2d at 730; Butler, 414 A.2d at 852. See supra note 34. 
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The concurrence feared that the majority's position will encourage 
attorneys to take on the role of judge and jury to determine whether their 
client's testimony is truthful. 101 This concern was unnecessary because 
the appellate state court determined that the defendant actually intended 
to commit perjury. 102 Because the attorney had good cause to know his 
client intended to commit perjury, 103 the question of what might estab-
lish good cause was never at issue. Thus, the concurring opinion's criti-
cism was misplaced. 
Nix exp.ands the Strickland test by permitting courts to take a more 
active role in reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The 
majority opinion in Nix embraced the ABA Model Rules as the proper 
standard of conduct for a defense attorney whose client intends to com-
mit perjury. Under these rules, an attorney may never knowingly allow 
false testimony. Until the Court is confronted with a case dealing specifi-
cally with ethics in the profession, Nix provides guidance for both practi-
tioners and judges who must determine the proper conduct for an 
attorney whose client announces an intention to commit perjury. 
John M Seeberger 
101. See Nix, 415 U.S. at 188-89. 
102. See supra note 6-9 and accompanying text. 
103. /d. at 162-63. 
